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bBartlett School of Planning, UCL, Central House, 14 Upper Woburn Place, London WC1H 0NN, UKSummary. — In this study of households living in informal settlements in three principal Chinese cities, we analyze the associations
between informality, property rights, and poverty. We propose that informality can be understood in terms of property rights (pres-
ence/absence, strength, completeness, and ambiguity). Drawing on the property rights (entitlements) theories of Sen, de Soto, Ostrom,
Alchian, and Coase, we reﬁne a list of property rights eﬀects that can be tested empirically. Using a household questionnaire survey of
1,208 respondents from a representative sample of 60 urban villages in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, we use robust regression
models to detect statistical relationships between household performance on six poverty domains as a function of four property rights
domains, controlling for income, human capital, and other inﬂuences. We ﬁnd evidence for what we call Sen eﬀects and de Soto eﬀects.
Our models show that some property rights are associated with lower poverty indicators. But we also ﬁnd evidence to show that the
absence, weakness, or ambiguity of property rights also reduce poverty indicators on particular domains, through what we assume
to be a substitution eﬀect. Informal settlements permit poorer household to live at lower costs than is usually, or oﬃcially, acceptable,
and thus spend more on other welfare-enhancing expenditures. The distribution of property rights determines the size, distribution, and
impacts of these trade-oﬀs and shapes the economic and social performance of informal settlements.
 2015TheAuthors. Published byElsevierLtd.This is an open access article under the CCBY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/).
Key words — chengzhongcun, slums, urban poverty, Sen, de Soto, property rights*The authors thank the UK Economic and Social Research Council for
funding this research project (grant reference: RES-167-25-0448). Final
revision accepted: October 2, 2015.1. INTRODUCTION
Informality is a widely used and contested notion used to
characterize large parts of the housing sector in developing
countries (Gilbert, 2002; Roy, 2011). The intensive study of
informal settlements in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury has yielded a variety of explanations, deﬁnitions, and con-
ceptualizations (Bhalla, 1990; Davis, 2006; De Soto, 2000;
Harris & Todaro, 1970; Mangin, 1967; Mullan, Grosjean, &
Kontoleon, 2011 and many others). Much of the discussion
revolves around land tenure, poverty, self-organization, gov-
ernment interventions, migration, income disparity, informal
economy, infrastructure, and governance issues. Most com-
mentators would regard informal urban neighborhoods as a
solution for the low-incomed, especially recent migrants, but
also a problem for many modernizing municipal governments.
They arise and are distinguishable from other types of neigh-
borhood through processes of land development that lie to
various degrees outside of legal land conversion, development,
and building processes. Because of the lack of laws governing
their subdivision, construction, maintenance, and governance,
they are often viewed as slums. They are endured and even
encouraged by governments because land conversion within
formal legal frameworks renders housing unaﬀordable to large
swaths of urban populations in developing countries. Formal-
izing or at least stabilizing tenure, infrastructure, and services
are emphasized in normative studies.
The applicability of the concept of informal settlements to
China has been debated because of the absence of squatter
communities in that country (Wu, Zhang, & Webster, 2013).
It is clear, however, that China does have an informal housing
sector in its so-called chengzhongcun, or ‘villages in the city’
(urban villages for short) (Tian, 2008; Zhang & Zhao, 2003).
Since housing in these quarters is either owner-occupied or
rental, formal land tenure categories cannot alone be used to
deﬁne and study housing market informality. Chengzhongcun
are not squatter settlements in the normal use of the term.461There are features of them, however, such as their densiﬁca-
tion, which are illegal or partially legal. It is development
rights, or air-rights above a legally owned plot of housing land
that, if anything, can be described as being squatted (i.e.,
appropriated and occupied without legal authorization). The
unique proprietary condition of China’s ‘‘favelas” demands
innovation in the way informality is deﬁned and measured
(Zhao & Webster, 2011).
To probe the meaning and consequences of informality in
China’s contemporary informal settlements we combine
insights from several, typically unrelated, behavioral theories
of property rights, notably: Armen Alchian’s economic theory
of property rights (1965); Amartya Sen’s notion of entitlement
failure (1981, 1997); Hernando de Soto’s propositions about
the economic deepening eﬀects of property rights security
(2000); Eleanor Ostrom’s theory of collective rights (1990);
and Ronald Coase’s transaction costs theory of property
rights (1937, 1960). We select these theoretical ideas because
they have proven to be powerful and inﬂuential in investigat-
ing a wide range of political-economic issues (three of the
authors are Nobel laureates). Each provides an analytical
framework that gives a particular insight into the impact of
laws on resource allocation. This is precisely what is needed
in understanding the origins, dynamics, and impacts of infor-
mal settlements since, as we have noted, the latter are charac-
terized by degrees of legality.
Amartya Sen (1981) tells us that the terms of trade between
entitlements and food can lead to poverty, vulnerability, and
starvation. By extension, a household’s ‘‘entitlement-set” (set
of entitlements or property rights) and its mapping to various
essential urban resources (what those rights can be exchanged
for) may lead to poverty, vulnerability, and ‘‘starvation” not
462 WORLD DEVELOPMENTonly of food but of housing, education, health care, and so on.
De Soto (2000) emphasizes the eﬀects of formalized entitle-
ments (or property rights – the two terms are used inter-
changeably in our paper) on poverty, vulnerability, and
wealth creation; arguing that property rights make resources
tradable, including the conversion of land into credit, and that
ownership prevents leakage of returns from investment and
thus increases petty entrepreneurship and productive upgrad-
ing of assets. Ostrom (1990) tells us that formal property rights
are not necessary to achieve social order in respect of scarce
co-consumed goods; common property can be eﬀectively
brought into productive use if the right cultural and institu-
tional conditions exist. Alchian (1965) tells us that entitle-
ments are held by degrees, which is not an insight formally
incorporated into de Soto’s, Sen’s or Ostrom’s analyses, nor
generally used in derivative studies. Coase (1960) suggests that
the distribution of property rights determines the economic
outcome of a resource allocation problem and that transaction
costs determine the supply and distribution of property rights.
Bringing these ideas together, we propose in this paper to
deﬁne and measure ‘‘informality” by a property rights proﬁle
that includes absolute and degrees of entitlements. We use this
household ‘‘informality proﬁle” to help explain income, food,
and housing poverty among a pseudo random sample of 1,208
households living in ‘‘urban villages” in three ﬁrst-tier Chinese
cities. We believe that this is the ﬁrst time these ideas have
been brought together in this way, both theoretically and
empirically. This theoretical and empirical innovation, we sug-
gest, is particularly useful for understanding the dynamics of
informal settlements in China; but it may also help unlock
new insights elsewhere. This may especially be so where prop-
erty rights are complex, dynamic, and evolving at the interface
of spontaneous action and government action, as is often the
case in squatter-led urbanization that has matured and co-
evolved with the formally planned system, such as in large
parts of Istanbul for example.
One of our main objectives in the paper is to test and further
develop a theory of informality based on Chinese data but
applicable elsewhere. Our basic proposition is that informality
can be empirically and theoretically deﬁned in terms of the
absence/presence and strength or degree of property rights.
This, we oﬀer as a theoretical development in the scholarship
of informal settlements.
Our empirical analysis both illustrates the proposition and
tests its explanatory power by measuring the systematic
impact of household property rights (informality) proﬁles on
household poverty.
Interpretation of the empirical results then takes the theoret-
ical agenda a step further by making explicit connections to
the ‘‘big-picture” political science theories summarized above.
We illustrate how those theories can give further nuanced
insights into the empirical models developed on the basis of
the starting proposition that informality can be deﬁned empir-
ically by enumerating a detailed list of property rights on sev-
eral poverty-relevant domains.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 consid-
ers what informality means in the context of migrant-worker
housing in Chinese cities. Section 3 probes the idea of informal-
ity using a variety of property rights concepts and introduces a
set of propositions linking property rights, informality, and
poverty. Section 4 sets out the method used in our empirical
study of urban villages, including a description of six poverty
indicators in four interrelated domains (income, savings, food,
and housing poverty) and a set of property rights indicators
under four categories (household registration, social-security,
employment, and housing rights) that, we hypothesize, inﬂuencepoverty measures. Section 5 presents the results from a set of
robust regression models, which estimate the eﬀects of these
entitlements on the poverty indicators. Section 6 is a discussion
that links these results to property rights propositions in Sec-
tion 3; and Section 7 concludes.2. CHINA’S ‘‘INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS
The existence, status, and function of modern Chinese
‘‘slums” have been ambiguous during the 30 years of China’s
post-reform urbanization era. For a long time, urban poverty
was not oﬃcially recognized (Gustafsson & Li, 2004;
Ravallion & Chen, 2007); the emphasis being placed on the
staggering reduction of rural poverty through labor and land
market reforms and the associated shift of underproductive
rural workers to productive (but low-pay) urban jobs
(Appleton & Song, 2007). More recently however, govern-
ments have acknowledged the existence and scale of urban
poverty (Wang, 2004) and attention has been drawn to the
urban neighborhoods accommodating the urban poor: princi-
pally, former work unit block housing; residual pre-1949
streets left un-redeveloped through the centrally planned era;
and the chengzhongcun, (urban villages) (Wu, 2004). On the
face of it, the ‘‘slum” designation might well apply to the last
two of these (Gilbert, 2007), since it is in these neighborhoods
that housing and urban facility poverty seems to coincide with
income poverty and vulnerability (Wu, He, & Webster, 2010).
The vast majority on an urban low income now live in urban
villages across China, with the numbers being greater in the
cities of the south. Urban villages clearly perform some kind
of equivalent role to the informal settlements of other rapidly
developing countries (Perlman, 2010) in that they comprise, in
a large part, informally or semi-formally built low-cost homes
inhabited by rural–urban migrants.
But there are two signiﬁcant diﬀerences compared to the
informal settlements typical of other developing countries.
The ﬁrst is that these are not squatter settlements. They are
a unique style of private rental provision (Kung, 2000; Tian,
2008; Wang, Wang, & Wu, 2009; Zhu, 2002). The second is
that they are formed under a unique land tenure and set of col-
lective ownership institutions: collectively owned village land
governed by a village collective administration typically incor-
porated as a joint stock company (Wang et al., 2009).
This means that the informality in China’s informal settle-
ments does not principally mean lack of regularized (legally
binding) tenure. The majority of the urban poor have signed
a rental contract with their landlord. Rather, the informality
is created by a blend of institutions from the collective and
post-collective era co-evolving in parallel (Zhao & Webster,
2011; Woo & Webster, 2014) for a formal discussion of co-
evolution of private and collective urban institutions). China’s
informal settlements are a particular legacy of the ‘‘one-coun
try–two-systems” reformist policy of Deng Xiaoping. And
because of the pragmatism of that policy, especially in the
Southern coastal cities where it combines with powerful
clan-based local politics (Tian, 2008), China’s ‘‘favelas” are
as much a part of the DNA of its sprawling cities as are Rio’s
(Perlman, 2010).
We ask, in this paper, how the complicated bundle of prop-
erty rights conferred on urban village dwellers by multiple
institutions before and during China’s economic transforma-
tion aﬀects their income, savings, food, and housing poverty
status.
Rights conferred upon owner-occupiers and tenants of
China’s urban village buildings vary on several important
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law; the type of law by which they are established and sanc-
tioned; the eﬀectiveness of sanctions; and the strength of the
right regardless of whether it is established by law or by indi-
vidual or group force. It will be clear from this analytical state-
ment that we are using a deﬁnition of property rights that goes
beyond the merely legalistic deﬁnition. In this we follow the
tradition of the Law and Economics literature (Barzel,
1989), which recognises that rights over property can eﬀec-
tively be established by law or by force; and in the case of
the former, by formal (state-backed) or informal rules. A legal
right may be no right at all if the law is ill-designed and has no
teeth. On the other hand, as Ostrom has shown in numerous
rural situations (1990), traditional rights not backed by formal
laws may be highly eﬀective in governing contested resources.
This view of property rights is also accompanied by a more
profound insight (and critique of legalistic conceptions of
property rights): that because of the transaction costs of mak-
ing and enforcing contracts and laws, no property right,
whether established by government decree, judge, village com-
mittee or cultural convention, is ever complete (Hart &
Moore, 1990). There are always degrees of freedom and ambi-
guities in any property rights assignment, however established;
even in the most advanced rule-of-law-following society. In a
transitional society like China, the degrees of freedom are very
wide. So an analytical framework that recognises de facto as
well as de jure rights and talks in terms of degrees of rights
is potentially more useful than a purely legalistic and binary
deﬁnition (which accounts for the massive interest in the ﬁeld
of Law and Economics across the legal and social sciences).
For obvious reasons, this approach has great potential in stud-
ies of informal settlements, where the focus is precisely on
ambiguity and on the economic and social signiﬁcance of
rights ambiguity for the behavior of low-income residents,
land-owners, governments, and other stake-holders.
The empirical models in this paper look for associations
between movement on selected poverty dimensions and a vari-
ety of entitlements or property rights variables, some of which
are clearly established by law and others of which are more
graded.3. ENTITLEMENT PROPOSITIONS ABOUT CHINA’S
URBAN VILLAGES
Amartya Sen’s entitlement theory of poverty and starvation
(1981) oﬀers a novel framework for exploring the dynamics of
informal settlements. Its seminal insight into the cause of fami-
nes was that people can starve not only because of a shortage
of food stock but because of drastic changes in the terms of
trade between food and a household’s various resource entitle-
ments (entitlement mappings).
We propose that the essential idea can be readily extended
to other kinds of starvation. In the context of urban poverty,
poor households may face unfavorable terms of trade between
their labor and the various resources necessary for personal
survival and social reproduction in the city (which are diﬀerent
to rural survival and social reproduction requirements). There
are many studies showing that migrants sometimes work in
Chinese cities at the expense of education and health service
consumption (Solinger, 2006). In the Chinese context, they
cannot, however, easily choose to forgo permanent shelter as
the urban poor can in most other countries, since homeless-
ness and street living is outlawed in China. But they can forgo
health-care for non-life-threatening conditions and forego
adequate education for their children. Healthcare and educa-tional starvation can be said, in Sen’s terms, to be a condition
of sections of China’s urban poor (He, Liu, Wu, & Webster,
2010; He, Wu, Webster, & Liu, 2010).
However, informal settlements have a positive eﬀect on the
condition of the urban poor from another reading of Sen’s
poverty theory: they are sources of low-cost housing, provided
at conditions typically below those thought acceptable by gov-
ernments (Wang et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2013), and thus
improve the entitlement mappings of those with few resources
and lessen the incidence of ‘‘housing starvation” (homeless-
ness). This is achieved at the cost of poorer housing condi-
tions: giving rise to slums or ‘‘housing poverty” short of
starvation.
Two of the main criticisms of Sen’s original entitlement
model were that it assumes (a) a static view of entitlements
and (b) a single economic institution determining entitlement
mappings (perfect commodity markets). In contrast to this
simple abstraction, the ability of residents in China’s urban
villages to avoid or cope with poverty is determined by a mix-
ture of state-endowed, collective organization-endowed, indi-
vidually acquired, and market-purchased entitlements. The
institutions that facilitate the conversion (mapping) of one
right onto another are many-fold, including for example,
municipal, district, and street-oﬃce state welfare and urban
service agencies; village collectives; village joint-stock compa-
nies; and informal and formal labor, housing, capital, health,
and education markets. A household therefore has a complex
set of endowments, the exchange value of which depends
among other things on the strength and completeness of the
various rights endowed.
So, for example, the owner of a shared-equity self-built
house in the city of Guangzhou, might own the ﬁrst two ﬂoors
and therefore have full legal rights under China’s planning and
compensation laws. The owner of one of the building’s upper
ﬂoors, owned under what is referred to as ‘‘small property
rights”, has a weaker legal right since upper ﬂoors are deemed
illegal. This does not mean to say, however, that on demoli-
tion, the upper ﬂoor owner receives no compensation: com-
pensation laws have moved in favor of villagers over the
years and illegal building owners now receive at least the
building costs in compensation (making illegal building a
capital-neutral investment yielding high rental returns), and
sometimes more (Zhao & Webster, 2011). In addition, the
two co-owners may have signed an agreement protected by
contract law, giving them pro rata shares in the building
regardless of the exact legal status of their part of the property.
If this agreement is not in place, the eﬀective allocation of
property rights may be decided by local judgement in the vil-
lage organization or by force. All this means that security of
land tenure, as with security of any other endowment, is in
reality, held with a degree of probability. Property rights in
China’s urban villages are held in degrees, not in absolute
terms. The degree of a right held in respect of any particular
endowment is partly a function, as we have said, of the degree
of completeness of the agreements or contracts used to secure
the right. In the empirical analysis reported in this paper, we
investigate, among other things, the impact of degrees of rights
on various poverty indicators. For example, we ask whether
the degree of formality in home-rental contracts (written, oral,
no contract) is associated with various poverty indicators; and
similar with labor contracts.
This brings us to Hernando de Soto. Property rights have an
impact on poverty and economic underdevelopment in at least
three distinct ways in de Soto’s and associated arguments (De
Soto, 2000). First, a lack of landed property inhibits engage-
ment with the formal sector, principally, but not solely by
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credit. Second, the lack of property is a behavioral disincentive
to invest. A street trader is more likely to upgrade to a bicycle
cart from a handcart if she has a secure place to store it. Own-
ership of a bicycle cart makes it more likely that the trader will
invest in the search costs of discovering places undersupplied
with her trade. The longer and more secure a lease on a home,
the more likely a migrant is to invest in loyalty at the work
place and in social networking that might yield better employ-
ment opportunities. The more secure a labor contract, the
more likely it is that a worker will invest in training or other
forms of self-improvement and in more suitable clothes and
better equipment, all of which may make him more eﬃcient
and employable. Third, and generalizing the ﬁrst point,
resources protected by private property rights are more easily
exchanged and may thus more easily move from a less eﬃcient
to more eﬃcient use. In Chinese urban villages, making landed
property rights private, clear, and alienable (they are currently
collective, ambiguous, and inalienable under national law) is
likely to increase the productivity of village land. Land value
in urban villages is lower because crowding resulting from vil-
lagers maximising density on their inalienable plots of village
land by building cheaply upward and outward to the bound-
aries of neighboring plots, has the eﬀect of lowering the value
of the entire development project. Land rent is dissipated
through poor-quality, overcrowded environments.
Introducing a Coasian strand of property rights theory into
the discussion, we hypothesize that there is a natural pressure
for the informal rights in Chinese urban villages to be clariﬁed
and strengthened; in the extreme, converted into private
rights. The pressure to clarify rights comes from transaction
costs. If the costs of transacting are too high as a result of
non-existent, poorly sanctioned, or ambiguous property
rights, then existing rights will fragment and strengthen and
new rights be established to reduce these costs and facilitate
smoother economic and social interaction and wealth creation.
Coasian theory goes further to predict that if the costs of sub-
dividing common rights to private rights is lower than the
value thus created, then rights are likely to subdivide. In the
informal settlements of the world, rights over land, labor,
and capital are constantly subdividing as informal land, labor,
and capital markets mature and formalize (Webster & Lai,
2003).
We thus characterize an entitlement theory of informality
that supports and is shaped by various theoretical arguments
of pertinence to the study of informal housing areas. Some
of these reinforce each other, others work in opposite direc-
tions. For example, one argument emphasizes the positive
eﬀect of neighborhoods with limited and ambiguous property
rights and the toleration of ‘‘slum”-conditions. This might be
thought of as a ‘‘Sen entitlement-mapping substitution eﬀect”
of property rights on poverty (‘‘Sen eﬀect” for convenience).
Ambiguous rights that have the eﬀect of reducing housing
price thereby increase the bundle of goods a household can
purchase with a given set of endowments. Contrast this with
the argument for the negative eﬀect of limited and ambiguous
property rights and for the strengthening and clarifying of
property rights over the resources needed for urban survival
and reproduction, which may be thought of as a ‘‘de Soto
eﬀect” of property rights on poverty.
The opposition of these two emphases is illustrative of a
wide range of behavioral propositions about the eﬀects of
property rights on informality, poverty, and wealth creation
that are not so easily mapped to formal theories. A non-
exhaustive typology of poverty eﬀects of entitlements includes
the following (PRE = Property Rights Eﬀects):PRE1: A property right raises a household’s entitlement
mapping and can raise its real income.
PRE2: A right to a minimum standard of consumption in
one sector (particularly via regulation) can raise the cost
of urban living and increase poverty on other dimensions.
PRE3: Conversely, absence of a right to minimum stan-
dards (of any resource, including housing, education,
health care, and so on) can lower household expenditure
on that resource and reduce poverty on other dimensions.
PRE4: A property right can induce a household to invest in
the property/resource over which that right is held, since
the right prevents the beneﬁts of investment from leaking
away. Extending this: the longer term and the stronger
the property right, the greater the investment eﬀect.
PRE5: A property right can give collateral social beneﬁts,
such as greater social inclusion as a result of acquiring
property-owning status.
PRE6: A property right can give collateral economic bene-
ﬁts, such as greater chance of being hired as a result of having
an acceptable address or having access to a morning shower.
PRE7: A property right can give collateral ﬁnancial beneﬁts
such as access to collateralized bank loans.
PRE8: A property right means that a resource is more
likely to be traded in pursuit of mutual gains from trade
and thereby move from less productive to more productive
uses and owners, beneﬁtting both the individual and wider
economy and society. This accounts for PRE7, since the
rights to unambiguously owned land or other assets can
be subdivided and the right to alienation sold oﬀ temporar-
ily to a bank in exchange for borrowed capital (collateral-
ized credit).
PRE9: Property rights and the organizations that create
and govern them will tend to evolve over time in response
to the costs of transacting scarce resources. Rights over
the many informally shared resources found in informal
settlements will, over time, tend to fragment and formalize
in order to reduce the costs of economic and social transac-
tions. This will, in the aggregate, tend to decrease poverty
for those capturing the rights.
PRE10: Notwithstanding PRE9, a collective property right
can have the eﬀect of giving households poverty-reducing
access to shared-consumption goods and services. This
eﬀect can be seen at an early stage of an informal settlement
(prior to PRE9) and also in parallel to PRE9 with respect
to residual land and other assets that for whatever reason
resist privatization.
To caricature: PRE 1–3 can be designated Sen eﬀects; PRE
4–8 de Soto eﬀects; PRE 8 and 9 Coasian eﬀects; and PRE10
an Ostrom eﬀect. Of course these various theoretical emphases
in the study of entitlements, informality, and poverty are all
interlinked and some are overlapping. In the discussion of
our empirical models we use the above typology to character-
ize various property rights – poverty associations uncovered in
our sample of inhabitants of China’s informal settlements.4. METHOD
We empirically test associations between poverty and types
and degrees of property rights in a sample of informal migrant
villages in three Chinese cities, after statistical adjustments for
household head and household proﬁles, household production
function variables, and indicators of social cohesion. The
study is based on cross-sectional data drawn from the Urban
Living Conditions Survey, 2010 (ULCS) conducted across
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villages is quite distinct in each of these cities. In Guangzhou
they have clear village boundaries and comprise tightly packed
multi-ﬂoor buildings of modern rental apartments. Shanghai
is more underdeveloped in terms of housing. The remaining
residual villages in Shanghai retain some rural characteristics
but with intense internal subdivisions. For Beijing, besides
the remaining village buildings, there are purpose-built com-
pounds within urban villages, developed by small family
builders.
A complete list of urban villages was obtained from each
city’s municipal government oﬃce. From each list, 20 villages
were selected according to the principle of probability propor-
tion to size (PPS), which is a standard Chinese oﬃcial sam-
pling method. From each village, 20 households were
systematically selected through a random start address with
ﬁxed intervals. This address-based approach is widely used
in Chinese household surveys to capture rural migrants
because there is no oﬃcial list for migrants. In this way, a
set of twenty statistically representative migrant villages was
chosen from each of the three cities and a pseudo-random
sample of 1,200 households constructed plus 5% extra to allow
for dropout. 1,208 valid questionnaires were obtained, giving
an approximately 95% response rate, achieved through a strict
and well-practiced method of interview. The sample of repre-
sentative residents sharing analogous social, environmental,
and institutional settings in the three cities was administered
a survey comprising 229 questions based on Likert scales, con-
tinuous and dichotomous variables. These were designed to
capture individual respondent’s socio-demographics, poverty
status as well as indicators of the degree of command over var-
ious property rights bundles. The questions were categorized
into ﬁve components: basic situation of household members;
family income and expenditure; living conditions; employment
status of the head of household; and community neighbor-
hood conditions.
As far as we are aware, this is the ﬁrst attempt to report rep-
resentative proﬁles of Chinese urban village dwellers at a city
or multiple city scale. The household proﬁles will be of interest
to researchers investigating speciﬁc villages and will allow
them to place their case study households within the wider
population of urban village households from which their case
study is drawn.
The study employs six indicators of poverty as dependent
variables: measures of income, household food consumption,
savings, degree of dwelling-level over-crowding, access to basic
household amenities, and housing expenditure to total expen-
diture ratio.
The ﬁrst three are expressed respectively as the natural log-
arithm of per-capita household income, household food
expenditure and savings. Over-crowding is measured as the
natural logarithm of per-capita dwelling area for each house-
hold. An index of household amenities is computed for each
household to assess the degree of access to eight basic ameni-
ties: separate kitchen, separate toilet, shower facilities, lique-
ﬁed gas, gas pipeline, air conditioning, heating/heating
equipment, and internet. The index ranges from zero to one,
with zero representing absolute deprivation of household
amenities and being synonymous with highly informal settle-
ments; and a value of one, indicating absence of deprivation.
Housing expenditure ratio is calculated as a household’s ratio
of expenditure incurred on housing to total household expen-
diture.
We do not attempt to categorize households as poor or not
poor, or to estimate their vulnerability to poverty. The idea is
to measure how the six selected dimensions of poverty moveindependently with patterns of entitlements (rights over vari-
ous types of welfare-enhancing resources). This models the
movement of the multi-dimensional ‘‘corners” or axes of a
Sen-theoretic entitlement-mapping hyperplane (conceptually,
a multi-dimensional budget curve).
Individual and household production functions comprise
socio-demographic measures for the head of household and
for the household as a whole, including household registration
status, gender, number of dependants, level of educational
attainment and an index of social cohesion; the latter two
being the human capital component of the household produc-
tion function. The importance of lack of social capital in exac-
erbating poverty and poverty traps in an informal economy
has long been underscored. Educational attainment is modeled
as a ﬁve-factor variable (none/primary school, junior high
school, senior middle school, technical secondary school, col
lege/undergraduate/postgraduate) with the second category
acting as a reference.
Social cohesion acts as an intangible asset in an informal
economy, enabling residents to function cooperatively and
take collective action to pool together scarce resources and
to try to secure claims to property rights. This has been statis-
tically controlled for in our models through an index of social
cohesion, a 12-component indicator of a respondent’s percep-
tion of community social cohesion.
Household registration (hukou) comprises four categories:
city non-agricultural household, city agricultural household,
rural non-agricultural household, and rural agricultural
household. For simplicity, it has been recoded as a three-
factor variable; city household, rural agricultural, and rural
non-agricultural household. Hukou is a legacy institution from
the centrally planned era conferring various social welfare and
labor market access entitlements to those registered within a
territorial jurisdiction.
Beyond the hukou entitlement, we test the relationship
between poverty and the presence and degree of entitlements
by employing three types of entitlement bundle: property
rights pertaining to social security, employment, and housing.
The social security entitlement bundle has been operational-
ized as a presence or absence of old-age insurance, medical
insurance, unemployment insurance, work injury insurance,
and other social insurance.
Property rights with respect to employment are parameter-
ized in terms of labor contract type and employment stability.
Labor contract type is coded as a ﬁve-factor variable namely,
self-employed & business owner, permanent & long-term con-
tract (P3 years), short-term contract (0–3 years), temporary
(no contract), and others, with the ﬁrst acting as a reference
category. Employment stability is coded as a four-factor vari-
able namely, highly stable with no change in employment over
the past 3 years, moderately stable (up to one change), unsta-
ble (up to three changes) and very unstable (greater than three
changes) with the ﬁrst acting as a reference category.
Property rights with respect to housing are expressed in
terms of tenancy type, tenancy contract type, residential stabil-
ity, presence of landed property right, and the degree of tran-
sition in property rights. Tenancy type indicates the title of
housing property right and is coded as a four-factor variable
including tenancy of village self-built units, urban residential
private units (built by villagers and sold to outsiders illegally
under a so-called ‘‘small property rights”), village collective
construction, and public housing units/workers’ collective dor-
mitory/others with the ﬁrst acting as a reference category.
Tenancy contract type is employed in the models as an indica-
tor of the strength of property rights and comprises three
factors; written contract, oral contract, and no contract.
466 WORLD DEVELOPMENTResidential stability is measured as a duration of stay of a
household and acts as a proxy for the intangible de facto rights
to urban public goods that a respondent commands with
increasing duration of stay. It is measured as a four-factor
variable; 0–2 years, 3–5 years, 6–10 years and greater than
10 years of stay with the ﬁrst category acting as the reference.
The importance of landed property rights is underscored in
our models with the help of a two-factor variable: owner of
a residence in hometown and non-owner. The strength of loca-
tional entitlements is measured in terms of two additional vari-
ables. Probability of demolition is assessed in terms of the
prevailing perception of residents regarding the anticipated
future demolition of their neighborhood. Land acquisition is
modeled as a two-level factor (no loss of farm land/ partial
or complete loss of farm land) and acts as a surrogate for
new entitlements gained via compensation as well as for the
poverty-inducing eﬀects of land dispossession (eﬀects working
in opposite directions on poverty).
The relationships between these multiple categories of enti-
tlements and the six indicators of poverty were examined. As
the indicators of poverty and housing informality all have a
non-normal distribution, a non-parametric Kruskal–Wallis
test was employed to examine the level of statistical signiﬁ-
cance of the diﬀerences of means across categories. A series
of linear regression models were run for each of the poverty
indicators and the associations with entitlements studied. A
robust regression technique was employed to account for
non-normality and adjustments for the pull of the outliers in
the data. Beta (standard error), 95% conﬁdence intervals,
and the level of statistical signiﬁcance (a) at p < 0.05 and
p < 0.10 are reported. All statistical analyses were conductedTable 1. Descriptive statistics of the indicators of
Predictors
Beijing
Per-capita income (Yuan/Month) 2383.1 (1978)
Household Food Expenditure (Yuan/Month) 820.0 (558)
Household savings (Yuan/Month) 400.2 (982)
Per-capita dwelling area (m2) 11.6 (21)
Index of household amenitiesy 0.27 (0.23)
Housing expenditure ratio 0.20 (0.21)
Household proﬁle
Gender (Female), % 12.95
Number of dependants, range 1–6
Educational attainment, %
None/primary school 10.00
Junior high school 36.79
Senior middle school 31.43
Technical secondary school 5.71
College/undergraduate/postgraduate 16.07
Index of social cohesion* 0.59 (0.13)
yThe Index of household amenities is an eight component additive index compri
shower facilities, liqueﬁed gas, gas pipeline, air conditioning, heating/heating e
and 0 in case absent. The overall index has been enumerated as
P
Ai/8.
The Housing expenditure ratio was enumerated as the ratio of expenditure inc
household expenditure.
*The Index of social cohesion is a 12-component additive index comprising of c
The 12 components comprised questionnaires related to perceptions of: friendli
attain help from neighbors, know many of the community, known by nei
participation in public events, community problem solving, importance of com
living in the same community. They were coded across ﬁve categories (5 = stro
the overall index has been enumerated as
P
SCi/60.using the statistical software package Stata 11.2 (StataCorp,
College Station, TX).5. RESULTS
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the outcome vari-
ables and key proﬁles of household heads for the three cities
of Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. In general, predictors
of poverty of study participants residing in the urban villages
diﬀered signiﬁcantly, with Shanghai consistently positioning
itself at the higher end of the spectrum (being least prosperous
with respect to most of the six predictors) followed by Beijing,
while Guangzhou was at the opposite extreme. Mean per-
capita monthly income in Yuan varied between 2,132 (S.D.
= 1182) in Shanghai, 2,383 (S.D. = 1978) in Beijing, and
3,716 (S.D. = 11,996) in Guangzhou. 74% of the survey par-
ticipants reported an income higher than the cut-oﬀ poverty
line of 400 Yuan/month (indicating the basic sustenance level).
Average monthly food expenses and savings in Yuan for
Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou are 648 and 1,004; 820
and 400; and 1,183 and 1,148 respectively. Mean per-capita
dwelling area in Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou is 4.26,
11.6, and 24.9 square metres respectively while the mean
household amenities index is 0.12, 0.27, and 0.54, respectively.
The housing expenditure ratios reported are 0.13, 0.20, and
0.19, respectively. Table 2 presents the mean and standard
deviation of the outcome variables across categories of prop-
erty rights and entitlements and the results of a Kruskal–
Wallis test reporting the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerence of means
across categories.poverty/informality and key household proﬁle
Mean (S.D.) p-Value of diﬀerence
Shanghai Guangzhou
2132.1 (1182) 3716.2 (11,996) 0.33
648.1 (418) 1182.7 (2487) <0.01
1003.5 (1549) 1148.2 (3118) <0.01
4.26 (2) 24.9 (33) <0.01
0.12 (0.10) 0.54 (0.18) <0.01
0.13 (0.10) 0.20 (0.18) <0.01
18.92 14.13
1–6 1–6
<0.01
18.46 17.10
40.00 38.66
28.46 27.88
5.77 7.06
7.31 9.29
0.61 (0.10) 0.60 (0.12) 0.07
sing of indicators of household amenities: separate kitchen, separate toilet,
quipment, and internet. Each amenity (Ai) has been coded as 1 if present
urred in housing (including utilities and housing maintenance) to the total
omponents of respondent’s perception of social capital in the community.
ness of community members, similarity of value and lifestyle, propensity to
ghbors, sense of belonging to the place, care of neighbor’s perception,
munity membership, care for each other, and long-term wish to continue
ngly agree 4 = agree 3 = neutral 2 = disagree 1 = strongly disagree) and
INFORMALITY, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND POVERTY IN CHINA’S ‘‘FAVELAS” 467(a) Associations of income, household food expenditure, and
savings poverty indicators with entitlements
The results of the Kruskal–Wallis test for the whole sample
(the three cities combined) are given in Table 2. These indicate
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in income, food expenditure, and sav-
ings across the categories of most of the indicators of property
rights/entitlements. The mean per capita income varies signif-
icantly according to household registration; being highest in
rural non-agricultural households and least among the city
households in urban villages. However, household food expen-
diture and savings are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across the
three household registration categories. Per-capita income dif-
fers signiﬁcantly between those with and without social secu-
rity entitlements in the form of old-age insurance, medical
insurance, unemployment insurance, and work injury insur-
ance. Food expenditure varies signiﬁcantly between those with
and without medical insurance, while savings varies signiﬁ-
cantly across the two categories of work injury insurance.
Per-capita income diﬀers signiﬁcantly across employment con-
tract type, being higher among those having a permanent/
long-term contract than those with short-term and temporary
contracts. Household food expenditure varies signiﬁcantly
across categories of labor contract type; however, diﬀerences
in household savings are not signiﬁcant. Diﬀerences in per-
capita income, household food expenditure, and savings are
not signiﬁcant across categories of employment stability. Sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences in per-capita income and savings are
reported with respect to the tenancy tenure type, with dwellers
of urban private residential units having the greatest income
and savings, while those living in village collective construc-
tions earn and save the least. Per-capita income varies signiﬁ-
cantly with tenancy contract type, with owners of written
contracts earning more than those with no contract and oral
contract. Household food expenditure and savings also exhibit
signiﬁcant diﬀerences across tenancy contract type with hold-
ers of permanent contracts spending and saving more, fol-
lowed by oral contract holders and then ‘‘no contract”. Per-
capita income and savings are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across
categories of residential stability, while household food expen-
diture does vary, being greatest in residential households with
the duration of stay in excess of 10 years. Signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences in mean per-capita income are found between respon-
dents owning property in their town/village of hukou
registration and those not, with the former having higher
per-capita income. Finally, household food expenditure and
savings vary signiﬁcantly between those who anticipate demo-
lition of their urban neighborhood and those who do not. Res-
idents who have partially or completely lost arable land have
higher mean food expenditure than those who have not lost
any land or property to redevelopment requisition.
Table 3 presents the results of a robust regression analysis of
these data, indicating associations between income, food con-
sumption, and savings poverty measure and the various prop-
erty rights/entitlements predictors, controlling for human
capital and other household production function components.
‘‘City” is coded as a dummy variable to detect the signiﬁcance
of being located in Shanghai, Beijing, or Guangzhou (city
eﬀect) compared to other eﬀects.
Controlling for household proﬁles and property rights/enti-
tlement bundles, survey participants residing in Shanghai had
signiﬁcantly higher per capita income and savings (b = 0.164
and b = 0.281 respectively, p < 0.05), but lower per capita
food expenditures (b = 0.061, p < 0.05), with Beijing being
the reference category. Guangzhou had comparatively higher
per capita income, food expenditure, and savings but the dif-ferences compared to Beijing were not signiﬁcant. This is an
intriguing result worthy of further study: holding household
proﬁle constant, including household size, social capital, and
so on; and holding entitlements constant (hukou, tenancy,
labor contract type and so on), there is a positive area-eﬀect
(higher per capita income and savings and lower food costs)
on urban village residents in shanghai compared to those in
Beijing. These are likely to be a result both of diﬀerences in
the labor markets of the two cities and diﬀerences in the typ-
ical locations of urban villages in the two cities (which would
inﬂuence, for example, wage levels, gross and net revenues of
small businesses, and food prices).
With reference to rural-agricultural hukou households, rural
non-agricultural hukou households tend to earn signiﬁcantly
greater per-capita income (b = 0.137, p < 0.05), controlling
for the confounding factors listed. Household food expendi-
ture and savings are both positively associated with per-
capita income (b = 0.157 and b = 0.447 respectively,
p < 0.05). Greater per-capita income is associated with higher
educational attainment, being signiﬁcant for respondents who
went to senior middle school and college (b = 0.123 and
b = 0.321 respectively, p < 0.05). However, household food
expenditure and savings are not signiﬁcantly associated with
education. Among the social entitlements, those with medical
insurance had signiﬁcantly higher per-capita income
(b = 0.150, p < 0.05) and lower savings (b = 0.096,
p < 0.05) in reference to those without. Similarly, those with
‘‘other social insurance” tended to spend signiﬁcantly more
on food (b = 0.077, p < 0.05). Per-capita income was inversely
associated with old age insurance (b = 0.135, p < 0.10), and
household savings was inversely associated with medical and
unemployment insurance (b = 0.126 and b = 0.144 respec-
tively, p < 0.10).
The relationship between income and labor contract type
indicates that compared to the self employed and business
owner reference category, those with labor contracts falling
under the category of short term, temporary, and others had
comparatively lower per-capita income (b = 0.124,
b = 0.127, and b = 0.186 respectively, p < 0.05). A sys-
tematic decreasing trend in income is observed as one moves
across the categories associated with reduced employment
contract security. Similarly, those with short-term labor con-
tracts have signiﬁcantly lower savings compared to self
employed and business owners (b = 0.084, p < 0.10). In
comparison to householders with highly stable jobs, those
with unstable jobs have a lower income (b = 0.151,
p < 0.10), while those with moderately stable jobs and very
unstable jobs have signiﬁcantly lower savings (b = 0.088
and b = 211 respectively, p < 0.05).
Among housing property rights, neither per-capita income
nor household food expenditure is signiﬁcantly associated
with the tenancy tenure type. Compared to tenants of village
self-built units, occupants of the urban residential private units
have signiﬁcantly higher savings (b = 0.205, p < 0.05), while
those living in village collective construction have lower sav-
ings (b = 0.240, p < 0.05). Tenancy contract type is a signif-
icant predictor of all three indicators of poverty. With
reference to residents with written tenancy contract, those with
oral tenancy contracts and without any contract have signiﬁ-
cantly lower per-capita income (b = 0.113, and b = 0.154
respectively, p < 0.05) as well as household food expenditure
(b = 0.037, p < 0.10 and b = 0.060, p < 0.05, respec-
tively). Furthermore, with reference to residents with written
tenancy contracts, those without any tenancy contract have
higher household savings (b = 0.175, p < 0.05). Only house-
hold food expenditure varies signiﬁcantly with degree of
Table 2. Results of Kruskal–Wallis one-way ANOVA comparing the indicators of poverty/informality across the categories of property rights/entitlements
Predictors Percent Per-capita
income
(Yuan/month)
Food expenditure
(Yuan/month)
Savings
(Yuan/month)
Per-capita
dwelling
area (m2)
Index of household
amenities
Housing
expenditure ratio
Mean (S.D.)
Residence registration
Rural agricultural household 77.5 2643.2 (7845) 866.5 (994) 842.9 (2298) 12.9 (23.5) 0.30 (0.24) 0.19 (0.19)
City household 4.7 2250.0 (1706) 652.7 (565) 428.2 (961) 24.3 (50.1) 0.42 (0.27) 0.13 (0.11)
Rural non-agricultural household 17.8 3247.3 (3346) 1154.2 (3135) 868.1 (1719) 14.7 (17.9) 0.35 (0.28) 0.17 (0.14)
p-Value of diﬀerence across categories <0.001 0.121 0.515 0.002 0.012 0.175
Property right/entitlement bundle – Social security
Old-age insurance (p*-value of diﬀerence) 25.2 0.003 0.660 0.840 <0.001 0.001 0.003
Medical insurance (p*-value of diﬀerence) 37.7 0.001 0.003 0.067 0.139 0.472 0.045
Unemployment insurance (p-value of diﬀerence) 6.7 <0.001 0.204 0.658 0.019 0.018 0.102
Work injury insurance (p*-value of diﬀerence) 11.8 0.045 0.507 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.125
Other social insurance (p*-value of diﬀerence) 9.2 0.109 0.063 0.667 0.003 <0.001 0.196
Property right/entitlement bundle – Employment
Labor contract type
Self-employed & business owner 37.7 2653.9 (4097) 1016.6 (1309) 1109.6 (3059) 12.5 (14.8) 0.37 (0.26) 0.25 (0.21)
Permanent & long-term (P3 years) 6.4 3394.5 (2293) 1679.3 (5065) 702.5 (1187) 14.5 (15.7) 0.40 (0.27) 0.12 (0.09)
Short-term (0–3 years) 24.2 3265.4 (13,023) 757.5 (472) 644.8 (1202) 11.9 (18.1) 0.28 (0.24) 0.13 (0.11)
Temporary (No contract) 22.7 2379.9 (2782) 729.7 (515) 525.3 (1199) 16.4 (40) 0.26 (0.22) 0.14 (0.14)
Others 9 2170.6 (1825) 725.7 (666.4) 860.9 (1342) 16.7 (23.4) 0.29 (0.26) 0.20 (0.21)
p*-Value of diﬀerence across categories 0.002 <0.001 0.404 0.013 <0.001 0.000
Employment stability
Highly stable (No change) 65.7 2766.6 (8330) 961.2 (1876) 881.4 (2316) 11.9 (23.4) 0.32 (0.25) 0.18 (0.17)
Moderately stable (1 change) 19.5 2592 (3569) 879.3 (682) 793.4 (1889) 16.5 (29.4) 0.31 (0.24) 0.21 (0.21)
Unstable (1 < changes 6 3) 8.3 2934.2 (4047) 735.8 (550) 408.8 (870) 13.6 (20.8) 0.29 (0.24) 0.17 (0.17)
Very unstable (>3 changes) 6.5 2757.2 (2689) 695 (463) 869.4 (2430) 22.2 (29.3) 0.33 (0.26) 0.16 (0.14)
p*-Value of diﬀerence across categories 0.929 0.102 0.382 0.002 0.920 0.083
Property right/entitlement bundle – Housing
Tenancy tenureship type
Villages’ self-built units 78.4 2648.2 (7576) 813.4 (562) 776 (2202) 12.6 (22.8) 0.30 (0.24) 0.19 (0.18)
Urban residential private units 11.9 3447.0 (6074) 1500.6 (2813) 1689 (2688) 11.8 (18.6) 0.35 (0.29) 0.19 (0.16)
Village collective construction 4 2563.4 (2544) 1893.8 (6074) 551.5 (884) 19.5 (22.9) 0.40 (0.24) 0.15 (0.14)
Public housing/units/collective dormitory/others 5.7 2649.0 (2375) 783 (562) 684.1 (1227) 27.2 (46.1) 0.43 (0.28) 0.13 (0.15)
p*-Value of diﬀerence across categories 0.039 0.162 0.031 <0.001 0.002 0.043
Tenancy contract type
Written contract 37.9 3608.7 (11,348) 1181.7 (2379) 1076.5 (3048) 16.2 (18.7) 0.44 (0.25) 0.22 (0.19)
Oral contract 44.1 2245.7 (2110) 743.4 (514) 813.8 (1446) 10.5 (29.3) 0.20 (0.19) 0.16 (0.15)
No contract 18 2264.3 (2001) 695.4 (465) 377.2 (837.6) 16.1 (21.9) 0.32 (0.23) 0.19 (0.20)
p-Value of diﬀerence across categories 0.011 <0.001 0.005 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Residential stability (duration of stay)
0–2 years 35 3211.0 (11,120) 777.2 (505) 692.4 (1457) 14.4 (18.7) 0.31 (0.25) 0.18 (0.18)
3–5 years 31.2 2361.8 (1978) 954.4 (2396) 975.3 (2062) 12.3 (23.7) 0.28 (0.24) 0.17 (0.16)
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INFORMALITY, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND POVERTY IN CHINA’S ‘‘FAVELAS” 469esidential stability; village tenants of 6–10 years and greater
than 10 years of stay tend to spend signiﬁcantly more on food
than new and fairly recent tenants of 0–2 years (b = 0.050 and
b = 0.076, respectively, p < 0.05). Compared to those who
own houses in hometowns or villages, non-owners have signif-
icantly lower per-capita income (b = 0.309, p < 0.05).
Among the indicators of degree of security of property rights,
slightly lower household food expenditure is reported by
tenants who do not anticipate demolition of their residences
(b = 0.072, p < 0.05).
(b) Associations of housing poverty indicators with entitlements
Signiﬁcant variability in the indicators of housing poverty
across categories of entitlements was observed (Table 2). Both
per-capita dwelling area and index of household amenities
vary signiﬁcantly across the three categories of household reg-
istration, city households being better oﬀ, and rural agricul-
tural households being most deprived. Among the variables
of social entitlements, mean per-capita dwelling area and index
of household amenities vary signiﬁcantly between holders and
non-holders of old-age insurance, unemployment insurance,
work injury insurance, and other social insurance. The mean
housing expenditure ratio is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in categories
of old-age insurance and medical insurance. All three indica-
tors of housing poverty diﬀer signiﬁcantly across employment
contract type, being lowest among those having permanent/
long-term and highest among the holders of temporary con-
tract. Housing expenditure ratio is signiﬁcantly higher for
self-employed and business owners compared to the employed.
Of the housing poverty indicators, only per-capita dwelling
area varies signiﬁcantly among categories of employment sta-
bility. Contrary to expectation, holders of very unstable jobs
have the highest mean dwelling space. Signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in all three housing poverty indicators are found with respect
to tenancy tenure type, with the category of public housing/
units/collective dormitory/others being associated with maxi-
mum dwelling space, amenities, and minimum housing expen-
diture ratio. Similarly, signiﬁcant diﬀerences are observed
across categories of tenancy contract type, with holders of per-
manent contracts being associated with better quality housing
than those having oral contracts and no contracts. Both per-
capita dwelling area and index of household amenities vary
signiﬁcantly across categories of residential stability, both
being signiﬁcantly higher for respondents with a longer dura-
tion of stay. Residents with landed property in their home-
town or village have higher housing expenditure ratios,
higher per capita income, and lower living space compared
to those without. Compared to residents predicting demolition
of their neighborhoods, those who consider their neighbor-
hood to be more secure have signiﬁcantly higher mean per-
capita dwelling area and index of household amenities. Resi-
dents who have partially or completely lost arable land/home-
stead to land acquisition have signiﬁcantly better household
amenities and more space than those who have not.
Table 4 presents the results of a robust regression of the
three housing poverty measures and property rights indicators
for the whole sample. Controlling for household proﬁles and
property rights/entitlement bundles and with Beijing as the
reference category, survey participants residing in Shanghai
had signiﬁcantly lower dwelling area, household amenities,
and housing expenditure ratio (b = 0.214, b = 0.110, and
b = 0.040 respectively, p < 0.05), while those residing in
Guangzhou had higher dwelling area and household amenities
(b = 0.382, and b = 0.280 respectively, p < 0.05). Compared
to rural-agricultural hukou households, urban-hukou house-
holds generally had lower housing poverty, while rural
Table 3. Results of the robust regression indicating the degrees of association between income, food consumption, savings, and property rights/entitlements
Predictors Log (per-capita income) Log (food-expenses) Log (savings)
Beta (S.E.) 95% C.I. Beta (S.E.) 95% C.I. Beta (S.E.) 95% C.I.
Constant 8.322** (0.142) 8.044, 8.601 1.565** (0.133) 1.304, 1.826 0.695** (0.260) 1.208, 0.182
City
Beijing (ref)
Shanghai 0.164** (0.060) 0.046, 0.282 0.061** (0.025) 0.110, 0.011 0.281** (0.058) 0.166, 0.395
Guangzhou 0.039 (0.059) 0.078, 0.155 0.017 (0.023) 0.029, 0.063 0.085 (0.054) 0.021, 0.191
Household proﬁle
Gender (Female vs. Male) 0.076 (0.063) 0.200, 0.048 0.078** (0.027) 0.130, 0.026 0.030 (0.052) 0.131, 0.072
Number of dependants 0.242** (0.019) 0.279, 0.204 0.100** (0.008) 0.083, 0.116 0.195** (0.017) 0.161, 0.228
Educational attainment
Junior high school (ref)
None/primary school 0.072 (0.064) 0.197, 0.053 0.018 (0.026) 0.032, 0.069 0.016 (0.050) 0.114, 0.083
Senior middle school 0.123** (0.053) 0.019, 0.227 0.008 (0.022) 0.036, 0.052 0.011 (0.040) 0.068, 0.089
Technical secondary school 0.110 (0.093) 0.072, 0.293 0.054 (0.039) 0.023, 0.130 0.132* (0.076) 0.019, 0.283
College/undergraduate/postgraduate 0.321** (0.089) 0.147, 0.495 0.035 (0.037) 0.038, 0.109 0.010 (0.074) 0.136, 0.157
Index of social capital 0.289 (0.186) 0.654, 0.076 0.142* (0.075) 0.290, 0.005 0.056 (0.144) 0.341, 0.229
Log-income 0.157** (0.014) 0.129, 0.185 0.447** (0.027) 0.393, 0.500
Residence registration
Rural agricultural household (ref)
City household 0.120 (0.121) 0.357, 0.117 0.007 (0.049) 0.102, 0.089 0.017 (0.115) 0.210, 0.245
Rural non-agricultural household 0.137** (0.061) 0.016, 0.257 0.026 (0.026) 0.077, 0.024 0.004 (0.046) 0.096, 0.087
Property right/entitlement bundle – Social security
Old-age insurance 0.135* (0.07) 0.272, 0.003 0.032 (0.029) 0.089, 0.024 0.062 (0.056) 0.049, 0.173
Medical insurance 0.150** (0.056) 0.040, 0.260 0.028 (0.022) 0.015, 0.071 0.096** (0.041) 0.176, 0.015
Unemployment insurance 0.143 (0.118) 0.089, 0.376 0.063 (0.049) 0.160, 0.033 0.144* (0.083) 0.308, 0.020
Work injury insurance 0.035 (0.080) 0.192, 0.121 0.024 (0.036) 0.095, 0.046 0.104 (0.067) 0.028, 0.236
Other social insurance 0.096 (0.093) 0.087, 0.279 0.077** (0.037) 0.005, 0.149 0.105 (0.073) 0.039, 0.249
Property right/entitlement bundle – Employment
Labor contract type
Self-employed & business owner (ref)
Permanent & long-term (P3 years) 0.089 (0.098) 0.104, 0.282 0.037 (0.042) 0.046, 0.12 0.012 (0.072) 0.153, 0.130
Short-term (0–3 years) 0.124** (0.062) 0.245, 0.003 0.023 (0.025) 0.026, 0.072 0.084* (0.046) 0.175, 0.007
Temporary (No contract) 0.127** (0.058) 0.241, 0.013 0.036 (0.023) 0.01, 0.082 0.061 (0.045) 0.150, 0.028
Others 0.186** (0.085) 0.354, 0.018 0.011 (0.034) 0.079, 0.057 0.022 (0.061) 0.098, 0.142
Employment stability
Highly stable (No change) – ref
Moderately stable (1 change) 0.066 (0.055) 0.173, 0.041 0.015 (0.023) 0.060, 0.030 0.088** (0.042) 0.170, 0.006
Unstable (1 < changes 6 3) 0.151* (0.087) 0.321, 0.019 0.026 (0.037) 0.047, 0.098 0.016 (0.072) 0.157, 0.125
Very unstable (>3 changes) 0.017 (0.091) 0.196, 0.162 0.01 (0.036) 0.061, 0.082 0.211** (0.068) 0.345, 0.078
Property right/entitlement bundle – Housing
Tenancy tenure type
Villages’ self-built units (ref)
Urban residential private units 0.009 (0.070) 0.147, 0.129 0.002 (0.039) 0.079, 0.074 0.205** (0.061) 0.085, 0.325
Village collective construction 0.174 (0.139) 0.099, 0.447 0.009 (0.053) 0.113, 0.096 0.240** (0.100) 0.438, 0.042
Public housing/ units/ collective dormitory/others 0.032 (0.102) 0.232, 0.168 0.033 (0.040) 0.046, 0.111 0.015 (0.076) 0.165, 0.136
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INFORMALITY, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND POVERTY IN CHINA’S ‘‘FAVELAS” 471non-agricultural hukou households were worse oﬀ. However,
the diﬀerences were not signiﬁcant. All three indicators of
housing poverty vary signiﬁcantly with per-capita income as
expected. Per-capita dwelling area and index of household
amenities are positively associated with per-capita income
(b = 0.101 and b = 0.065 respectively, p < 0.05), while hous-
ing expenditure ratio has a negative association (b = 0.088,
p < 0.05). Educational attainment is negatively associated
with housing poverty, an expected human capital housing
market eﬀect: with reference to those attending junior high
school, those with senior middle school education have higher
per-capita dwelling area and household amenities (b = 0.058,
p < 0.50 and b = 0.039, p < 0.10, respectively). Similarly, the
index of household amenities is signiﬁcantly higher among res-
idents with technical secondary school degrees (b = 0.077,
p < 0.05) as well as college/undergraduate/postgraduate
degrees (b = 0.069, p < 0.05). Considering indicators of social
entitlements, respondents with old age insurance have compar-
atively lower household amenities index (b = 0.040,
p < 0.05). Those with old-age insurance and any other social
insurance had higher household amenities (b = 0.038 and
b = 0.048, p < 0.10).
With respect to labor contract type, respondents with tem-
porary labor contracts are signiﬁcantly poorer both in terms
of per-capita dwelling space and household amenities
(b = 0.041, p < 0.10 and b = 0.037, p < 0.05, respec-
tively), compared with self employed and business owners.
Also, compared to self employed and business owners, all
other categories of labor contract exhibit a signiﬁcant negative
association with household expenditure ratio (b = 0.074 for
permanent and long-term employed, b = 0.067 for short-
term contract and b = 0.091 for temporary contract): house-
holds headed by workers on wage contracts spend less on
housing, controlling for income, than those self employed;
the more so the more insecure the wage contract. Compared
to holders of highly stable employment, those with moderately
stable job history report signiﬁcantly higher per-capita
housing expenditure ratio (b = 0.027, p < 0.05).
The general trends in our models indicate that public welfare
housing is synonymous with lower degrees of housing poverty,
while private housing is associated with higher housing pov-
erty. Compared to those living in villagers’ self-built units, liv-
ing in a private housing unit (sifang) belonging to urban
residents is associated with lower per-capita dwelling area
(b = 0.111, p < 0.05). In short, living in the housing of
urban landlords means smaller living space because the house
is more valuable (because it could be transacted in the urban
housing market in contrast to rural housing, which cannot
be sold directly in the urban housing market). Renters in the
public housing/units/collective dormitory/others category
have signiﬁcantly lower housing expenditure ratio
(b = 0.068, p < 0.05). As with our income-poverty indica-
tors, tenancy contract type remains a signiﬁcant predictor
for all three indicators of housing poverty. Compared to resi-
dents with written contracts, those with oral contracts have
signiﬁcantly lower per-capita dwelling area, lower index of
household amenities, and lower housing expenditure ratio
(b = 0.047, b = 0.078, and b = 0.049 respectively,
p < 0.05). Residents with no tenancy contract have signiﬁ-
cantly lower housing expenditure ratio (b = 0.040,
p < 0.05) implying comparatively lesser amounts expended
in housing utilities and maintenance.
Among the indicators of locational security, compared to
tenants who anticipate demolition, those who do not, have sig-
niﬁcantly lower household amenities (b = 0.035, p < 0.10)
and lower housing expenditure ratio (b = 0.037, p < 0.05).
472 WORLD DEVELOPMENT6. DISCUSSION
These results present a ﬁne-grained picture of the associa-
tions between six dimensions of poverty and four dimensions
of property rights and informality in China’s informal settle-
ments. The advantage of this methodology is that the picture
can be read and interpreted at various levels of detail, for
example, with a focus on poverty-informality; poverty-
property rights; or particular kinds of poverty, informality,
and property rights (or entitlements, if preferred). By deﬁning
informality in terms of property rights, we are able to dissect
its constituent meanings systematically. Since the relationships
uncovered in Tables 2–4 are too many to discuss in terms of
these many possible perspectives, we leave readers to develop
their own particular interpretations. In this section, however, we
sample the kind of analysis, particularly theory-building, that
our work permits; drawing out some general patterns discov-
ered, using the distinctions made in Section 3 between Sen
and de Soto eﬀects and PRE categories (property rights eﬀects).
Starting with the associations between property rights and
income, food, and savings poverty indicators, the higher per
capita income of rural non-agricultural hukou households
compared to rural agricultural hukou holder is probably a
PRE1 (human capital) eﬀect. Such migrants are more urban-
savvy and entrepreneurial than otherwise similar rural hukou
holders. The greater per-capita income associated with higher
educational attainment is another PRE1 (human capital
eﬀect). The higher per-capita income associated with medical
insurance; higher food expenditure associated with ‘other
social insurance are also probably PRE1 (human capital)
eﬀects. People with higher human capital endowments can
negotiate better paid jobs that endow additional
employment-related rights.
The inverse relationship between per capita income and old-
age insurance, and between household savings and medical
and unemployment insurance suggest that insurance premi-
ums might be a substitute for savings and food expenditure.
Either insurance reduces the need to save or insurance premi-
ums reduce the capacity to save. By the same account, the
results are consistent with the idea that people forgo current
income and savings to secure future investments. This is a
PRE2 eﬀect: securing a right to a minimum standard of future
income and current health-care via the insurance market
increases poverty on another dimension.
The lower income of short-term and temporary labor con-
tract types compared to comparable self-employed and busi-
ness owners could indicate PRE4, 6, 7, and 8 eﬀects as well
as more nuanced PRE1 (human capital) eﬀects: shorter term
labor contracts inhibit personal investment in a job and limit
access to collateral economic and ﬁnancial beneﬁts. The same
may be said of the decreasing trend in income when moving
down the employment contract security categories; the lower
savings of those with short-term labor contracts; and the lower
incomes of those with more unstable jobs. All may point to a
set of de Soto eﬀects.
The higher savings of households in urban residential
private units (small property rights semi-legal ownership)
compared to tenants of villager owned units, controlling for
income, shows the diversiﬁcation of the informal housing mar-
kets in urban villages. These units are purchased from villagers
illegally and occupied by urban hukou holders or better-oﬀ
migrants. This may also be a PRE1 (human capital eﬀect),
with urban hukou holders having more chance to accumulate
savings; but it is also a PRE3 eﬀect, with households willing
to trade oﬀ lower housing costs for less secure ownership
rights.The lower income and food expenditure of those with an
oral tenancy contract or without any contract on their home
seems likely to be a PRE1 (human capital) eﬀect, unless it
implies that landlords of this kind of tenancy exploit low-
income tenants with higher rents, thus reducing food expendi-
ture compared to comparable households with more secure
accommodation contracts. In which case, this is another kind
of PRE1 eﬀect: lack of clear rights leads to exploitative rental
prices. The fact that those with oral tenancy contracts have
higher household savings may be consistent with the idea that
people with less secure accommodation feel the need to save
more. This is a kind of PRE3 eﬀect, with a trade-oﬀ being
made between lower tenure security and higher savings.
The higher food expenditure of those who have lived longer
in urban villages is likely to be partly PRE5-7 eﬀects, with
longer established households being willing to spend more
on food consumption because of higher neighborhood social,
economic, and ﬁnancial capital (particularly social capital).
The lower income of those not owning houses elsewhere (a
minority of the sample) is consistent with both collateral and
investment versions of de Soto property rights eﬀects
(PRE4). However, we do not know the extent to which village
and hometown homes are used as collateral (informally or for-
mally). To the extent that households in our survey included
income from the ﬁrst homes in their disclosed income totals,
this is a ﬁrst-order PRE1 eﬀect: higher income arising from
landed property ownership.
Moving to housing poverty indicators, higher housing expen-
diture ratios for rural non-agricultural hukou-holders com-
pared to rural agricultural households implies that town/
city-to-city migrants reside in informal dwellings that have
poorly invested in household utilities and maintenance. This
may well reﬂect the particular location choices they make as
urban entrepreneurs. This is a PRE1 (human capital) eﬀect.
The higher housing poverty among lower education house-
holds is also a PRE1 (human capital) eﬀect.
The poorer amenities among respondents with medical
insurance could reﬂect a substitution eﬀect between housing
and social security consumption. The positive relationships
between amenities and old-age and other social insurance,
probably reﬂect non-income-related employment and loca-
tional beneﬁts.
The poorer space and amenity standards for those with tem-
porary labor contracts highlights the positive inﬂuences of
employment-based entitlements toward reducing housing pov-
erty after statistical adjustment for income; respondents at the
same income level but less secure employment contract are
poorer in terms of per-capita dwelling area and household
amenities. This could be partially a PRE1 eﬀect but it may also
be a classic example of a de Soto eﬀect (PRE4–7). The same
may be said of the ﬁnding that households headed by workers
on wage contracts spend less on housing, controlling for
income, than those self employed; the more insecure the wage
contract, the less the housing expenditure ratio.
The better housing conditions (housing expenditure ratio)
associated with moderately stable compared to highly stable
employment histories is a puzzle, but may indirectly point to
subtle human capital eﬀects (PRE1); in an unstable labor mar-
ket those better oﬀ in terms of human capital have a greater
propensity to take risks by moving jobs in search of better
value in terms of housing conditions.
The lower space standards of those living in private ‘small
property rights’ housing reﬂect the nature of these construc-
tions: modern, commodity housing with relatively good
amenities but relatively expensive and located in high density
neighborhoods. There is a PRE3 eﬀect here: lower space
Table 4. Results of the robust regression indicating the degrees of association between housing informality and property rights/entitlements
Predictors Log(per-capita dwelling area) Index of household amenities Housing expenditure ratio
Beta (S.E.) 95% C.I. Beta (S.E.) 95% C.I. Beta (S.E.) 95% C.I.
Constant 0.230* (0.139) 0.043, 0.503 0.297** (0.094) 0.482, 0.112 1.000** (0.071) 0.861, 1.139
City
Beijing (ref)
Shanghai 0.214** (0.025) 0.264, 0.165 0.110** (0.017) 0.144, 0.077 0.040** (0.013) 0.065, 0.014
Guangzhou 0.382** (0.025) 0.333, 0.431 0.280** (0.017) 0.247, 0.314 0.003 (0.013) 0.022, 0.028
Household proﬁle
Gender (Female vs. Male) 0.030 (0.027) 0.083, 0.022 0.012 (0.018) 0.047, 0.023 0.045** (0.014) 0.071, 0.018
Number of dependants 0.102** (0.009) 0.119, 0.085 0.026** (0.006) 0.014, 0.038 0.028** (0.005) 0.036, 0.019
Educational attainment
Junior high school (ref)
None/primary school 0.029 (0.027) 0.024, 0.081 <0.001 (0.018) 0.035, 0.036 0.012 (0.014) 0.015, 0.039
Senior middle school 0.058** (0.022) 0.015, 0.102 0.039* (0.015) 0.009, 0.068 <0.001 (0.012) 0.023, 0.022
Technical secondary school 0.041 (0.039) 0.035, 0.117 0.077** (0.026) 0.026, 0.129 0.033 (0.021) 0.008, 0.073
College/undergraduate/postgraduate 0.060 (0.038) 0.014, 0.134 0.069** (0.025) 0.020, 0.119 0.004 (0.020) 0.043, 0.036
Index of social capital 0.222** (0.078) 0.070, 0.375 0.059 (0.053) 0.045, 0.162 0.015 (0.040) 0.094, 0.063
Log-income 0.101** (0.015) 0.071, 0.13 0.065** (0.010) 0.045, 0.085 0.088** (0.008) 0.103, 0.074
Residence registration
Rural agricultural household (ref)
City household 0.033 (0.051) 0.068, 0.134 0.034 (0.034) 0.033, 0.102 0.012 (0.026) 0.04, 0.063
Rural non-agricultural household 0.008 (0.026) 0.058, 0.043 0.024 (0.017) 0.059, 0.010 0.027* (0.014) 0.000, 0.053
Property right/entitlement bundle – Social security
Old-age insurance 0.020 (0.029) 0.077, 0.038 0.038* (0.02) 0.001, 0.077 0.001 (0.015) 0.031, 0.028
Medical insurance 0.018 (0.023) 0.064, 0.028 0.040** (0.016) 0.072, 0.009 0.012 (0.012) 0.035, 0.011
Unemployment Insurance 0.016 (0.05) 0.082, 0.115 0.011 (0.033) 0.055, 0.077 0.014 (0.027) 0.066, 0.038
Work injury insurance 0.006 (0.033) 0.06, 0.071 0.021 (0.023) 0.065, 0.024 0.008 (0.019) 0.030, 0.046
Other social insurance 0.042 (0.039) 0.034, 0.118 0.048* (0.026) 0.003, 0.100 0.005 (0.02) 0.034, 0.044
Property right/entitlement bundle – Employment
Labor contract type
Self-employed & business owner (ref)
Permanent & long-term (P3 years) 0.019 (0.041) 0.099, 0.062 0.028 (0.028) 0.027, 0.082 0.074** (0.022) 0.118, 0.031
Short-term (0–3 years) 0.013 (0.026) 0.063, 0.038 0.007 (0.017) 0.027, 0.041 0.067** (0.013) 0.093, 0.04
Temporary (No contract) 0.041* (0.024) 0.088, 0.007 0.037** (0.016) 0.069, 0.004 0.091** (0.012) 0.115, 0.067
Others 0.033 (0.036) 0.038, 0.103 0.046* (0.024) 0.001, 0.094 0.029 (0.018) 0.064, 0.007
Employment stability
Highly stable (No change) - ref
Moderately stable (1 change) 0.028 (0.023) 0.017, 0.073 0.008 (0.015) 0.038, 0.022 0.027** (0.012) 0.003, 0.051
Unstable (1 < changes 6 3) 0.051 (0.036) 0.122, 0.020 <0.001 (0.024) 0.048, 0.048 0.019 (0.02) 0.020, 0.057
Very unstable (>3 changes) 0.049 (0.038) 0.026, 0.124 0.033 (0.026) 0.083, 0.018 0.025 (0.019) 0.063, 0.013
Property right/entitlement bundle – Housing
Tenancy tenure type
Villages’ self-built units (ref)
Urban residential private units 0.111** (0.029) 0.169, 0.054 0.017 (0.02) 0.056, 0.022 0.026 (0.021) 0.016, 0.067
Village collective construction 0.016 (0.058) 0.098, 0.130 0.020 (0.039) 0.097, 0.057 0.03 (0.029) 0.088, 0.028
(continued on next page)
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Table 4. (continued)
Predictors Log(per-capita dwelling area) Index of household amenities Housing expenditure ratio
Beta (S.E.) 95% C.I. Beta (S.E.) 95% C.I. Beta (S.E.) 95% C.I.
Public housing/ units/ collective dormitory/others 0.031 (0.043) 0.053, 0.116 0.022 (0.029) 0.035, 0.079 0.068** (0.022) 0.11, 0.025
Tenancy contract type
Written contract (ref)
Oral contract 0.047** (0.022) 0.09, 0.004 0.078** (0.015) 0.107, 0.049 0.049** (0.011) 0.071, 0.027
No contract 0.022 (0.028) 0.078, 0.033 0.031 (0.019) 0.068, 0.007 0.040** (0.014) 0.068, 0.012
Residential stability (duration of stay)
0–2 years (ref)
3–5 years 0.032 (0.023) 0.077, 0.013 0.020 (0.015) 0.050, 0.010 0.003 (0.012) 0.027, 0.020
6–10 years 0.035 (0.025) 0.085, 0.015 0.001 (0.017) 0.034, 0.033 0.013 (0.013) 0.039, 0.013
>10 years 0.043 (0.031) 0.104, 0.019 0.019 (0.021) 0.022, 0.061 0.011 (0.016) 0.021, 0.042
Housing in hometown
Yes (ref)
No 0.012 (0.036) 0.058, 0.083 0.003 (0.024) 0.051, 0.045 0.029 (0.018) 0.007, 0.065
Transition in property rights
Propensity to residential conversion
Yes (ref)
No 0.013 (0.027) 0.066, 0.039 0.035* (0.018) 0.070, 0.001 0.037** (0.014) 0.064, 0.010
Land acquisition
No loss of land (ref)
Partial or complete loss of arable land/homestead 0.004 (0.028) 0.052, 0.06 0.001 (0.019) 0.039, 0.036 0.021 (0.014) 0.007, 0.050
Result of robust regression in Stata 11.2 are expressed as beta (standard error), 95% conﬁdence interval.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
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for home prices that are relatively cheap compared to outside
the urban village (but still relatively expensive compared to
inside). Similarly, the lower housing expenditure ratio in vil-
lage collective construction units compared to self-built vil-
lager units reﬂect trade-oﬀs between rights, space, quality,
amenities, and so on, all having various PRE3 substitution
eﬀects in respect of property rights and housing poverty. This
also points to a diversiﬁcation in urban village housing mar-
ket.
The higher housing poverty among those with oral or no
accommodation contracts shows that controlling for income,
weaker land (housing) rights are associated with poorer space
standards, poorer amenities, and lower levels of income being
spent on housing. This is a classic informal settlement research
ﬁnding (although few studies manage to control for income).
In the face of high demand for low rental accommodation,
landlords supply low quality housing under informal condi-
tions and weaker property rights. This is partly a PRE3 eﬀect
and partly a PRE1 (human capital) eﬀect and ties in with the
ﬁnding that those with weak or no accommodation contract
have lower income and lower food expenditure. We note how-
ever, that there could be a de Soto eﬀect going on here, if weak
housing rights inhibit income-earning ability.
The higher housing poverty among those expecting their
neighborhood to be demolished probably reﬂects the fact that
poorer quality living environments are more vulnerable to
conversion under village redevelopment programs. The higher
space, amenities, and housing expenditure ratio of those who
have had land expropriated are likely to be attributable to
the additional entitlements gained in the form of monetary
and property compensation or dividends from shares in village
collective companies. This is a PRE1 eﬀect that is somewhat
counter-intuitive to common perceptions of the land-
dispossessed Chinese peasant (Zhao & Webster, 2011). It is
evidenced that the stories of peasants imprudently gambling
away their compensation packages, or dumped without
resources in the city, are not the full picture. Our data suggest
that transfer endowments via government-organized compen-
sation place them in a better position with respect to urban
housing poverty than equivalent households who have not
been dispossessed of land.
We do not have space to elaborate an analysis of PRE 9 and
10 eﬀects, but can summarize an important point. The
property rights eﬀects on poverty implied in the forgoing
discussing provide a ﬁne-scale and complex example of both
the Ostrom and Coase PRE eﬀects deﬁned in Section 3.
Ostrom eﬀects, because what we see in our models is an
outworking of various communally created values (externality
costs and beneﬁts) being traded oﬀ with household private
budgets, in part facilitated by collectively organized and
governed rules. Urban villages started oﬀ life as urban spaces
under relatively unitary collective ownership. What happens to
ownership thereafter, can in part, be viewed as a success of the
commons. Our ﬁndings illustrate Coasian eﬀects because,
following the same line of reasoning, the multiplication and
fragmentation of rights over multiple urban village resources
and householders’ responses to them, is evidence of the
evolution of property rights in search of less costly resource
allocation.7. CONCLUSION
Based on a representative sample of urban villages in
China’s three principal cities, we have attempted to analyzein a high degree of detail, the links between property rights
(entitlements), informality, and poverty. By operationally
deﬁning informality in terms of an explicit proﬁle of property
rights and by drawing on well-founded formal theories of the
latter, we present what we regard as the most disaggregated
study yet of these issues in the context of China’s informal set-
tlements. Our principal aim has been to identify statistically
signiﬁcant associations between poverty indicators on the
one hand, and the presence/absence and degree of property
rights on the other. We have done this over six poverty
domains and four property rights domains. A second aim
has been to interpret these associations using selected key
themes in the property rights literature. We ﬁnd evidence of
both Sen eﬀects and de Soto eﬀects at work in China’s ‘‘fave-
las”.
An important insight from our study is that the absence of a
property right in an informal settlement potentially has both
negative and positive eﬀects. It can reduce overall welfare
because it means that access to a resource is insecure or
non-existent. On the other hand, because of substitution
eﬀects within the household budget, it can raise a household’s
entitlement mapping and reduce poverty on some other
dimension of welfare. Such property rights eﬀects in informal
settlements may be both imposed and voluntary. The segmen-
tation of informal housing markets within urban villages can
be viewed as a diversiﬁcation of property rights over land
and housing, with consumers and suppliers engaging in an
economic dance that results in a portfolio of options. Each
trade’s gains and losses associated with diﬀerent housing attri-
butes with other household budget items. Village residents
choose to consume certain resources with less or with more
degrees of rights, protection, and security. For example, they
choose to purchase retirement income security rights from
the insurance market and to forego living space per capita
or food consumption per capita.
On the other hand, ownership of certain property rights may
be coerced by a government. Through building regulations,
people may be coerced to consume a minimum standard of
accommodation. Through health and safety legislation, they
are forced to consume a minimum standard of workplace risk.
The economic and social vibrancy of informal settlements
comes in large part from the limited amount of coercive con-
sumption. There are risks associated with this, and that is why
Chinese city oﬃcials are in the process of demolishing many of
their urban villages. But ambiguities and gaps in property
rights turn informal settlements like chengzhongcun into low
transaction-cost incubator spaces in their host cities. This is
often stated as an ideological position; or noted in relation
to the beneﬁts of self-employment or to the contribution of
informal industry to value-added in formal sector industrial
supply chains or to the necessity of low cost informal services.
We have added to this a household-focused story, showing just
how complex and important for survival and advancement are
the trade-oﬀs between rights, uncertainty, costs, and beneﬁts
made in every dimension of the household economy. In so
doing, we present a ﬁnely grained and empirically calibrated
dissection of the notion of informality as it operates in China’s
rapidly disappearing ‘‘favelas”.
Our ﬁndings have relevance beyond China. Although the
complicated mix of institutions in chengzhongcun is peculiar
to China’s transitional period, we note that the institutions
governing informal settlements in all countries tend to diver-
sify over time. This renders the simpliﬁed descriptions, cate-
gories, and analysis appropriate for the initial phase of an
informal settlement less so after twenty or 30 years. Our theo-
retical and empirical frameworks can help policy makers
476 WORLD DEVELOPMENTunderstand how neighborhoods that started informally change
over time with respect to diﬀerent dimensions of informality.
This can help target anti-poverty interventions. It might even
save some communities from the bulldozer by providing evi-
dence of eﬀective self-organization over time. In Brasilia,
squatter communities have started to demand not just prop-
erty rights over individual housing plots but condominium-
style collective property rights over shared urban space and
facilities. In Istanbul, vast areas of what were once squatter
neighborhoods are about to be reorganized by Turkey’s ver-
sion of a Land Readjustment law. Throughout China, experi-
ments are underway to reorganize combined bundles of land
rights and other urban entitlements. Urban village committees
transformed into joint stock companies, for example, have thepower to negotiate with private capitalists and developers over
the distribution of rights under partnership redevelopment
schemes. An urban village may, for example, negotiate the
packaging up of its collective land into a mixed-use develop-
ment of high-end commerce, low-income migrant housing,
village-owned middle-income condominiums, schools, indus-
tries, and worker dormitories, yielding capital from which it
can provide social security beneﬁts to its elderly people as well
as paying dividends to the villages who own the company
(Webster, Wu, & Zhao, 2006, chap. 11). Understanding the
substitution eﬀects between diﬀerent kinds of urban rights in
household decision-making provides an evidence base for cre-
ative institutional design in this kind of negotiated urban rede-
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